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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MUSIC SERVICE CORPORATION, 
a Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CLEO WALTON, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 
10704 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Statement of the Kind of Case 
This is an action quieting title to a strip of land 
located along the adjoining boundary lines of the 
parties' property. 
Disposition In Lower Court 
This case was tried to the court, judgment 
rendered in favor of defendant, and plaintiff takes 
his appeal. 
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Relief Sought on Appeal 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the trial court's judg-
ment with judgment in its favor as a matter of law 
ordered and a remand to the lower court for assess-
ment of damages in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendant. 
Statement of Facts 
Defendant is unable to agree with the statement 
of facts as contained in plaintiff's brief and will there-
fore restate the facts with the purpose in mind of 
giving to the court a narrative statement accurately 
presenting the evidence on which the trial court 
relied in finding in favor of defendant and against 
plaintiff. 
Parties to this action are the owners of adjoining 
tracts of land located at approximately 200 West 3900 
South Street, Salt Lake County, Utah. The tract 
owned by plaintiff is located on the east and the tract 
owned by defendant is located on the west. Exhibit 
D-11, an aerial photograph, accurately shows the 
general location of the property with the building 
on it which is denominated P. L. Henderson & Sons, 
Inc., being the plaintiff's property, and the property 
with the wrecked cars on it is the defendant's 
property. 
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Defendant purchased the property in May, 1959 
and since that time has occupied it continuously and 
has used the property which is in dispute during the 
whole period of time. (R. 110-A, R. 115) Shortly 
after Walton purchased his property, P. L. Hender-
son bought the property to the east, his actual pur-
chase being in February, 1960. He occupied the 
property from February, 1960 to February, 1965. 
( R. 81 ) vVhen Henderson purchased the property 
there was a fence along the west borderline of the 
property purchased. It was not a chain link fence, 
but was denominated as a hog wire fence. Henderson 
replaced the hog wire fence with the chain link 
fence. CR. 82) At the time he replaced the chain 
link fence there were two fences west of the barbed 
wire fence, one approximately 10 to 12 feet further 
west, and 18 feet further from that fence was a fence 
for Walton's dogs. (R. 82) Henderson removed the 
two fences that were west of the dog fence. In the 
spring of 1960 Mr. Henderson and Mr. Walton met 
at the property and Mr. Henderson took down the 
fences, filled in the property with a bulldozer, and 
installed the chain link fence. ( R. 83) At the time of 
the installation of the chain link fence, Henderson 
claimed that the line on his property was 10 feet 
further west from the place where the chain link 
fence was erected. Walton did not agree that 
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Henderson owned that additional 10 feet. CR. 84) 
Henderson had no further use for the ground to the 
west of the chain link fence, and after the dispute 
Henderson placed the chain link fence in a place that 
was satisfactory to him. CR. 85) From the time the 
chain link fence was placed on the property, vValton 
occupied the property to the west of the chain link 
fence. The location of the fence was satisfactory to 
Walton. One of the old fences was on the line where 
Henderson ran his chain link fence. CR. 8 7) Defend-
ant Walton testified that he was willing to have tllP. 
chain link fence mark the boundary and that he 
considered it the boundary since it was placed in by 
Mr. Henderson. CR. 112) 
The County Recorder's plats do not reveal any 
land separating the vValton land from the Henderson 
land. C See Exhibit D-10) The land purchased by 
defendant formerly belonged to one David Hansen 
and had been surveyed by a licensed surveyor and 
witness, Arnold W. Coon, in May, 1959. CR. 95 and 
96) Mr. Coon prepared Exhibit D-12. Examination 
of various maps of the property, Mr. Coon testified, 
showed a confusion between the properties as to 
where the property lines existed. CR. 99) Coon's sur-
vey revealed that the present chain link fence is on 
the line of the fence which was most easterly of the 
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two fences identified by Henderson. The witness 
Coon testified that he had examined the old plats 
of the land between the two pieces of property, and 
the chain link fence and the westernmost fence, and 
that there was no deed to show ownership to that 
strip of land, that his examination went back four or 
five years. CR. 101 - 102) Coon further testified that 
the Henderson property would be approximately 3 
feet wider when the chain link fence is used as its 
west houndary than the description contained in 
Henderson's deed. The strip between the two proper-
ties, when the Henderson property is measured from 
the east boundary line and the Walton property is 
measured from its west boundary line, is approx-
imately 12 feet. CR. 103-104) 
Witness Jean Hansen testified that she had been 
familiar with the property in dispute from 1948 
until 1961, and no use was made of the property 
between the two fences during those years. CR. 106-
107) She testified that there was sufficient distance 
between the two old fences to lead a horse through, 
"but nothing but a horse went through as long as 
I remember." CR. 107) She further testified that the 
strip was completely obstructed by vines and bushes 
in 1961. Mrs. Hansen was present when the old 
fences were taken out and the new fence placed there 
by Mr. Henderson. CR. 108) 
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On the 13th of Febrnary, 1964 P. L. Henderson 
& Sons, Inc. quit-claimed to White Investment Com-
pany, Inc. a strip of ground immediately west of the 
chain link fence, 9.24 feet in width. (See Exhibit 
P-4) On the 14th of December, 1964 M. Kenneth 
White and Ada Marie White, his wife, obtained a 
deed from C. W. Wilkins and Lucy A. Wilkins, his 
wife, covering a strip of land 11.48 feet wide, which 
appears to be along the area now in dispute. (See 
Exhibit P-U The description in the Wilkins' deed, 
however, refers to old fence lines and the testimony 
is without dispute that on the 14th of December, 
1964, the date the deed bears, there were no old 
fence lines in the area where the property is locatd 
which is disputed. The old fences which had been 
in prior to 1960 had been removed, the new chain 
link fence constrncted, and the area filled in and 
was being used by defendant Walton. 
Neither P. L. Henderson nor Wilkins, according 
to the evidence, have any chain of title to the land 
which is in dispute. Court found that at the time of 
the deed by Wilkins to White, Wilkins did not own 
the property described and had no chain of title to 
the property giving any color of title to Wilkins, 
and that the Wilkins' deed is what is denominated 
as a "wild deed". The court found that P. L. Hender-
son and defendant Cleo Walton had agreed that the 
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chain link fence built by Henderson would mark 
the boundaries between their properties and each 
has occupied to the chain link fence since the time 
it was constructed, that because of the P. L. 
Henderson-Walton agreement that the chain link 
fence would mark the boundary line of the property, 
the quit claim deed from Henderson to White Invest-
ment did not convey any property since Henderson 
had no property in the land west of the chain link 
fence. (See Findings of Fact) The court then quieted 
title to Walton in the strip of land west of the chain 
link fence, which is described and given a meets and 
bounds course in the Conclusions of Law and in the 
Decree of the court. 
The court further found that the plaintiff had 
suffered no damages by reason of '"al ton's occu-
pancy of the land to the west of the chain link fence. 
From this judgment the appeal is taken. 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED ANY TITLE 
TO THE STRIP IN DISPUTE 
The evidence on which the trial court could rely 
shows that since 1948 the strip of land which is 
approximately 12 feet wide and which lies east of 
the meets and bounds of defendant's ground and 
west of the meets and bounds description of plaintiff's 
ground, was not occupied or used until Henderson, 
plaintiff's predecessor in interest, removed the fences 
and put up his chain link fence. Since that time in 
1960 defendant has occupied and used the strip. CR. 
106-107) No deed to the strip was of record and 
the County Recorder's plat does not show any gap 
between the parties' adjoining property lines. (See 
Exhibit D-10) White, predecessor in interest to 
plaintiff, attempted to establish a right to the strip 
by obtaining a deed from C. W. Wilkins and Lucy A. 
Wilkins describing a strip 11.48 feet wide in Decem-
ber, 1964, (See Exhibit P-n and also obtained a quit 
claim deed from Henderson to the strip on the 13th 
of February, 1964. Neither Wilkins nor Henderson 
had any title to the strip as disclosed by their deeds. 
CR. 101-102) 
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In 1960 when Henderson went on the property, 
the dispute as to where the west line of his property 
ran as it related to the east line of Walton's property, 
arose. The testimony is without dispute that Hender-
son and Walton met in the vicinity of the property 
line and in the disputed property and Henderson 
made his claim, Walton disputed the claim, and they 
agreed that the chain link fence should be run in its 
present location. This divided the 12 foot strip, 3 
feet to Henderson and 9.4 feet to Walton. Since 1960 
Henderson occupied to the chain link fence on the 
east, Walton occupied to the chain link fence on the 
west. 
With no record title and no title by reason of 
adverse possession, plaintiffs cannot and have not 
established any title to the strip of land. 
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Point II 
DEFENDANTS HAVE ESTABLISHED TITLE BY 
BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMENT 
The evidence indicates that the descriptions of 
the adjoining properties leave a strip approximately 
12 feet in width between the plaintiff's and defend-
ant's property. This strip is not shown on the County 
Recorder's plats and there was no chain of title to 
the strip presented for the trial court's consideration. 
Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Henderson, and 
defendant Walton divided the 12 foot strip, 3 feet 
to Henderson and 9 feet to Walton, and along this 
dividing line Henderson constructed the chain link 
fence. 
This boundary line by agreement is completely 
undisputed. Henderson testified that he removed all 
the old fences and put in the chain link fence, and 
therefore he cannot claim that this line was not a 
satisfactory property line. Walton consented and so 
testified to the Henderson fence construction. He has 
continued since 1960 to the time of the filing of the 
action and to the present time in possession so that 
there is a boundary line by agreement clearly marked 
by a fence which has been recognized for a number 
of years. 
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The earliest American case that respondent has 
been able to find which discusses the principle here 
involved was decided by the Superior Court of Dela-
ware in the fall session of 184 7. It is entitled James 
Lindsay vs. Peter Springer, 4 Del. 547 (Harrington's 
Report). It is exactly in point on the fact that the 
adjoining parties discovered a strip of land between 
their two lines which was not covered by the deed 
of either. They agreed to divide the strip and marked 
the line, moving their fences on to the line so agreed 
upon. Later one of the parties attempted to renege 
on this agreement, saying that the surveyor had 
made a mistake and that he would not abide by the 
new fence line. The defendant argued that because 
the establishment of the boundary line was by parol 
agreement, it would not be conclusive unless it was 
acquiesed in by the parties for a period of at least 
twenty years. The court, in disposing of this conten-
tion, stated as follows: (P. 550) 
"If a written agreement were made, under cir-
cumstances similar to those which existed in 
the present case, to establish and abide by a 
boundary line, which is immediately located 
by the parties, pursuant to such agreement; 
no doubt the parties would be bound by it, 
as well after the lapse of one year, as of twenty 
years. But as the contract in such cases is not 
required to be in writing, (Boyd's Lessee vs. 
Graves, 4 Wheat. 517; Kip vs. Norton, 12 
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iv end. 130 > an express parol agreement fairly 
made in a like case, by virtue of vvhich the 
boundary is established and immediately 
followed up by possession, would have t:he 
same effect, of precluding the parties of after-
ward controverting it. The lapse of twenLy 
years is merely matter of evidence to establish 
a particular fact." 
A subsequent case reviewing and rec1tmg the 
law on boundary lines is Farr vs. Vloolfolk, 118 Ga. 
277, 1; SE 2JU. h1 this ca:-;c an argume11t was mad(· 
that the statute of frauds prohibited the establish-
ment of a boundary line by parol agreement between 
adjacent property owners. The Supreme Court of 
Georgia held otherwise and in disposing of this ques-
tion stated as follows: 
"This rule has been thus stated: 'Where the 
boundary line between two estates is indefinite 
or uncertain, the owners may by parol agree-
ment establish a boundary line and the line 
thus defined will afterwards control their 
deeds, notwithstanding the statute of fraud.' 
4 Am. and Eng. Enc. L. (2d Edition). See, 
also, 5 Cyc. 931." 
The earliest case respondent has discovered 
exactly in point in the western jurisdictions is Cava-
naugh vs. Jackson, 91 Cal. 580, 27 P. 931. This case 
involved a parol agreement to establish a dividing 
line between adjoining plots. The Supreme Court of 
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California, P. 931, stated the rules in the following 
language: 
"It is well settled that where the owners of 
contiguous lots by parol a~reement mutually 
establish a dividing line, and thereafter use 
and occupy their respective tracts according 
to it for any period of time, such agreement 
is not within the statute of frauds, and it can-
not afterwards be controverted by the parties 
of their successors in interest." 
The earliest Utah case which discusses the 
principles involved in boundary lines by agreement 
or acquiescence is Holmes vs. Judge, 31 U. 269, 87 P. 
1009. In this case there was no evidence concerning 
the original parties' intentions or agreements at the 
time the boundary line fences and improvements 
were constructed. The Supreme Court of Utah dis-
cussed at some length the fact that a party may agree 
as to the boundary line of their properties, and if 
possession is taken immediately and monuments 
erected to mark the boundary line, it will govern the 
true property line. It held that long acquiescence in 
such lines might establish an agreement where other 
evidence does not exist to establish it. Held that the 
line thus shown by improvements and fence and 
acquiesced in by the owners for a long period of time, 
was the true boundary. A subsequent Utah case, 
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Young vs. Hyland, 37 U. 229, 108 P.1124, the Utah 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the principles announced 
in Holmes vs. Judge, supra, and citing two other Utah 
cases, l\1oyer vs. Langton, 37 U. 9, 106 P. 508, and 
Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U. 99, 107 P. 25, stated the 
principle applicable in the following language: 
CP.234) 
"In those cases the doctrine is recognized, 
where the owner of adjoining lands occupy 
their respective premises up to a certain line 
which they recognize and acquiesce in as their 
boundary line for a period of time, they and 
their grantees will not be permitted to deny 
that the boundary line thus recognized is the 
true line of division between their properties." 
In the case of Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U. 99, 
107 P. 25, this court discussed the question of whether 
or not an agreement to establish a boundary line was 
binding upon the parties and cited several authorities 
where a long period of time had elapsed. The court 
then at Page 109 cited the following rule: 
"In a number of jurisdictions it seems to be 
well settled that where a boundary line is 
established by agreement of two adjoining 
owners title up to the line thus fixed may be 
acquired by estoppel, as well as by adverse 
possession. Where joining owners agree upon 
a boundary line and enter into possession and 
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improve the land according to the line thus 
agreed upon, the parties will be precluded 
from afterwards disputing that the line thus 
agreed upon is a true one, even if the statute of 
limitations is not run." 
In ruling upon the facts in the case, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: CP. 111) 
"Under the facts in this case we think the 
parties had a perfect right to agree upon a 
boundary line between their claims as they 
did. They also had the right to readjust this 
boundary line when the section line was estab-
lished which in view of the recitals contained 
in the first patent referred to, issued to William 
C. Rydalch, must have been at least some time 
prior to 18 71. It must therefore be assumed 
that both Mr. Kimball and Mr. William C. 
Rydalch knew that the section line had been 
established and where it was, but that in 
view of the improvements they had made, or 
for some other good reason, concluded to con-
tinue the boundary line marked by the fence 
as the permanent boundary line between their 
lands. By doing so they did not contravene 
any public statute, nor offend against any 
public policy, so far as we are aware." 
This court reviewed the law of the state in the 
case of Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 U. 57, 276 P. 912, an& 
recognized that the law of boundary lines established 
by adverse possession or acquiescence are as binding 
upon the parties as boundary lines conforming to 
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meets and bounds descriptions in deeds. In 1951 the 
Court in an extensive review of all of the prior 
decisions, reaffirmed the principles set forth. In 
Brown vs. Milliner, 120 U. 16, 232 P. 2d 202, it stated 
the law of the State of Utah in the following 
language: CP. 24) 
"A review of the Utah cases involving bound-
ary disputes reveals that it had long been 
recognized in this state that when the location 
of the true boundary between two adjoining 
tracts of land is unknown, uncertain or in dis-
pute, owners thereof may, by parol agreement, 
establish a boundary line and thereby irre-
vocably bind themselves and their grantees." 
A recent court decision restates the prior law of 
the state as outlined in the cited decision. It is Ekberg 
et ux vs. Bates et ux, 121 U. 123, 239 P. 2d 205. The 
court reiterated the prior holdings that owners of 
adjoining tracts of land whose true boundary lines 
are unknown, in dispute or uncertain, may by parol 
agreement establish boundary lines which are bind-
ing on themselves and their successors in interest. 
The court has in three very recent cases had 
occasion to reconsider the boundary line law of the 
State of Utah as it is affected by parol agreements 
and acquiescence. Those cases are Harding vs. Allen, 
10 U. 2d 370, 353 P. 2d 911; Nunley vs. Walker, 13 U. 
17 
2d 105, 369 P. 2d 117; and King vs. Fronk, 14 U. 2d 
135, 378 P. 2d 893. 
This court held that upon showing a visible, 
persisting, alleged acquiesced-in boundary over long 
period of time, party assailing boundary must show 
lack of agreement between neighbors, establishing 
the line on the visible marked boundary. 
Respondent has been unable to find any law 
inconsistent with the principles which he seeks to 
have applied by this Court. They are the principles 
applied by the trial court in the decision here on 
appeal. 
Conclusion 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed and the court 
should award respondent his costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this ...... day of ................... . 
------------------------, 19 ........ . 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Respondent 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
